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The Case of Teacher Pensions
The recent debt crises in New York City and Cleveland, the deterioration
of public infra-structures in certain of our states and larger cities, and the
occasional bankruptcy of smaller pension plans suggest that not all of local
finance stands on a sound fiscal base. This paper examines the trends in
funding for one form of state and local government debt--teacher pensions
underfundings--and asks what a central government might do to check any
unwanted growth in these liabilities. The analysis concludes (i) that this
form of state-local debt is sizeable and growing, (ii) that state andlocal
governments have an implicit pay-as-you-go bias in pension financingwhich
encourages the growth of debt, but (iii) central governmentbenefit and
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The New York City and Cleveland bond defaults, the closing as unsafe of
the bridges and roadways in New York, Boston, Philadelphia, and Cleveland, and
the declared bankruptcy of local employee pension plans in Michigan and
Pennsylvania are each a warning sign that the local fiscal sector may not, as
is often assumed, be resting upon a bedrock of fiscal surpluses. Even the
states of Texas and Alaska, once considered invulnerable to the threat of
fiscal collapse, have recently been forced to enact emergency tax measures to
insure their bills could be paid. While each of these instances has its own
unique history and may appear by itself to be an isolated event, there is a
common logic to the stories. The logic is one of fiscal competition between
local and state jurisdictions, a competition which induces local politicians
to maximize services for, and to minimize taxes upon, the current generation
of taxpayers. Yet as services rise and taxes fall for current residents and
firms, the local budget constraint requires someone to pay the shortfall.
That someone is a future taxpayer. The increased use of short-term borrowing
followed by debt roll—overs, a neglect of public infra-structures, and a
failure to adequately fund public employee pensions are all mechanisms for
shifting the current costs of public services onto future taxpayers. When
future taxpayers are unable to cover these local debts, or if they refuse, we
observe a default, a detour, or a bankruptcy.
While it is premature to announce today a state and local fiscal crisis,
it does seem wise to begin exploring what we might propose as policies if
local debt does prove to be a problem. Significant local debt unmatched by
assets may have important long-run allocative and equity implications. To
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limit such adverse effects we must look for policies today to stem its
growth. Two regulatory strategies are available to limit the growth in local
debt: reduce spending but hold taxes fixed or increase taxes but hold
spending fixed. If neither of these regulatory alternatives work——or if we
now face the problem of what to do about past debt--we might wish to consider
a debt "bail—out" strategy which more equitably distributes the burden of past
underfundings. This paper examines all three policy options for local debt
management——regulate spending, regulate taxes, or offer bail-outs——for one
particular, but important, case: public debt from underfunded teacher
pensions.
Section II presents estimates of the current stock of unfunded pension
debt for teacher pensions and discusses the possible implications of this debt
for the efficient and fair allocation of public resources. Section III
specifies and estimates a model of debt creation via teacher pension
underfundings and, given this model, predicts the likely trends in
underfundings to the year 2000. Section IV outlines three policy strategies
for the management of teacher underfundings--(i) a reduction in promised
pension benefits (a "control spending" policy), (ii) an increase in required
contributions (a "tax increase" policy), and (iii) a federal pension
assistance program (a "debt bail-out" policy)--and then simulates the relative
impact of each reform on the future trend in pension underfundings. Section V
summarizes our results.
II. The Funding Status of Teacher Eensions
Teachers comprise the largest single group of state and local public
employees. They are compensated, as are most public employees, through direct
wage payments and through the promise of a pension upon retirement. Teacher
pensions are defined benefit pensions which give each retiree an annuity upon
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retirement equal to a fixed fraction, called the replacement rate, of the
teacher's pre-retirernent salary. The replacement rate is defined as the
product of the annual benefit accrual rate (typically .02 per year) times the
number of years of teacher service. More recently, states have supplemented
this fixed annuity with a cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) to protect the real
value of the annuity in times of high inflation.
The accumulation of these pension obligations constitutes a fiscal
liability for which the taxpayers of' the state are responsible. To relieve
this liability, taxpayers can adopt either of two funding strategies. First,
taxpayers can save an amount each year such that those savings plus earned
interest will be just sufficient to pay the promised pensions of the teachers
when they retire. This strategy, called full—funding, insures that at the end
of each fiscal year, existing pension fund assets plus expected future
contributions are just equal to the expected pension obligations. The second
strategy, called pay—as—you-go, makes no explicit contributions for future
pensions but simply budgets for those expenditures when they fall due as part
of a current accounts allocation. The funding status of a pension fund
measures the gap between the present value of the promised pension obligations
and the present value of future employee contributions plus current plan
assets. Projections of pension benefits are based upon the growth in teacher
wages, the growth in the number of teachers who reach retirement, the
longevity of retired teachers, and the replacement rate (plus COLA protection,
if any) of the pension plan. Projections of future contributions depend upon
existing state laws for required employee contributions (usually as a fraction
of teacher wages) and the expected growth in teacher wages and employment.
This gap between the present value of promised obligations and the present
value of expected contributions and existing assets is called the unfunded
16.11.3_14 —
liabilityof the teacher pension and measures the implicit public debt created
for taxpayers by the pension system.
What is the present funding status of teacher pensions? Inman (1986a)
provides one set of estimates for the decade 1971-1980 for the forty-eight
mainland state teacher plans. Table 1 summarizes the main results. Three
conclusions emerge from the analysis. First, the trend in the average level
of real underfundings has been steadily upward over the decade, measured
either from the perspective of taxpayers (column 1) or teachers (column 3).
Second, the real level of implicit public debt is significant, approaching 8%
of taxpayer real income by 1980 (column 2) and 60% of the promised pension
wealth to the average teacher (column U). Third, there is great variation in
the level of pension—created public debt; some plans are in real trouble with
debt levels over $500/resident (column 6) while other plans are well funded
with debt levels of only a $100/resident or less (column 5).
If allowed to grow, these underfundings of teacher pensions may have
significant consequences for economic efficiency and fiscal equity. First,
increases in the stock of public employee pension debt may have adverse
effects on private savings in a manner fully analogous to increases in social
security debt; see E'eldstein (1974). If increases in public employee pension
debt are viewed by current employees and taxpayers as a transfer of' wealth
from future taxpayers to themselves, the "created wealth" may induce a decline
in today's rate of private savings; Inman and Seidman (1979) have found some
tentative evidence for this hypothesis using aggregate time series data for
the United States. Second, underfunded state and local pensions may create an
incentive to over-provide state and local services or to adopt a less than
efficient, more labor-intensive technology for service provision. Public




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































pension is underfunded by current taxpayers, it is possible for some of the
costs of current period labor to be shifted onto future taxpayers. If current
taxpayers then escape this burden--for example, by re-locating before the
pension debt falls due--then an implicit subsidy results in which future
taxpayers support a fraction of the labor costs of public services received by
current taxpayers. The resulting subsidy may stimulate a less than efficient
provision of state and local services; Inman (1982, 1986b) provides some
evidence that the purchase of public employee services is sensitive to the
degree of pension underfunding. Third, if pension underfunding precipitates a
fiscal crisis-—as is may have in the case of New york City--cities or states
may be forced into austerity budgeting with adverse consequences for the
provision of services. Such crisis fiscal management discourages the location
of economic activity to the possible detriment of long-run spatial efficiency.
The consequences of significant pension underfundings for fiscal equity
may be no less important. tjnderfundings benefit current taxpayers at the
possible expense of future taxpayers, future retirees, or future consumers of
public services. While aggregate income will be rising over time and the
average future taxpayer will be richer than the average current taxpayer, it
is not clear that state-local pension underfundings will automatically involve
a transfer from a rich future taxpayer to a poorer current taxpayer. If
underfundings can be avoided by re-locating and if the wealthy are more likely
to know the level of' underfundings and have a wider set of possible re-
location choices, then it may be that it is the richer current taxpayers who
escape high underfundings and leave the burden for relatively poorer future
taxpayers. This burden may be shared with future retirees if the promised
pension is not fully paid or with future public service recipients (e.g.,
children) if services are curtailed. Balancing these resulting transfers of
16.11.3—6—
wealthwill require an explicit welfare judgment, but the fact remains that
sizeable underfundings create potentially significant, and possibly unwanted,
redistributions of social resources.
There is one important check to all of these adverse consequences of
public pension debt, however. There is for public pension debt--and for
state—local debt generally—-a Ricardiari neutrality result which insures that
current taxpayers will bear the burdens of any state and local underf'undings.
If future taxpayers recognize the burden of the underfundings, they will
demand a fully compensating reduction in the price they pay for land when they
move into the state or local jurisdiction. This reduction in land price
insures that the current, not future, taxpayers bear the full burden of the
created public debt. Not only are any adverse redistributive effects avoided
by this capitalization process, but so too are the efficiency effects of
underfunding. Current taxpayer wealth, once increased by underfunding, is
returned to its original levels through capitalization; the disincentive to
private savings is thereby removed. Further, current taxpayers now bear the
full responsibility for the costs of hiring public employees; thus, efficient
labor hiring will result. Finally, while public employee pension debt still
exists on the books of the state or local government, the asset position of
future taxpayers has been increased by an equal amount thereby mitigating the
risks of a fiscal crisis. Through the capitalization of underfunded pension
debt, the private sector can neutralize the excesses of the public sector.
The important question is: Does it? Here the evidence is meager. Epple and
Schipper (1981) find evidence of full capitalization, but Iriman (1982, 1986b)
finds that employees and taxpayers budget as if only partial or no
capitalization occurs. The definitive resolution of this issue remains a
central research question.
16.11.3-7-
In the meantime, it seems prudent to address the question of what can be
done to control the future growth of state-local debt generally, and teacher
pension debt in particular. That is our task here. When the economic
interests of future taxpayers go unrepresented in the political arena, or
stand unprotected in the market place, then central government intervention
may be desirable. To examine the relative effectivenessof a central
government policy towards local debt, we must first determine the causes of
that debt. Section III provides the needed analysis for teacher pension
underfundirigs.
III. Teacher Pension Underfundings: Causes and Trends
A. Pension Accounting
The unfunded liability of a public employee pension system, of which
teacher pensions are typical, is defined as expected plan liabilities less
expected plan contributions and existing plan assets. Under plausible
specifications for the structure of plan benefits and plan required
contributions, the present value of expected liabilities less expected
employee contributions can be defined as an actuarial constant, Q, times the
current wage bill, wZ, paid to today's employees, 2., receiving a wage of w;
see Inman (1986a). Subtracting the level of assets accumulated to today will
define the remaining unfunded liability, U, due to be paid by taxpayers:1
(1) U2w2.-A
From the perspective of taxpayers, the actuarial constant 2 can be defined as
a positive function of the plan's benefit replacement rate (8) and the plan's
degree of COLA protection against inflation (specified as the rate of
protection, p,timesthe rate of inflation, )anda negative function of the
plan's required rate of contribution from employees (1e)c2 will also depend
16.11.3-8-
upon the years of employee service before retirement (R) and the expected rate
of growth in employee wages LJoclear a priori predictions for the
effects of R and u on 2 are possible, however. Both variables increase the
level of benefits and the level of employee contributions; if the benefit
effect dominates (is dominated by) the contribution effect then c2 will rise
(fall) as R or w increases. Formally, we specify 2 as:
(2) c2c2(, '0e'R, w)
The asset position of the pension plan is given by the level of assets
accumulated prior to today, A1, plus net contributions made today (n):
(3) n +A1
Net contributions in turn equals taxpayer contributions, plus interest
earnings, plus additional employee contributions above their required
contributions, less benefits paid from the plan to current plan members. In
the case of teacher pensions, taxpayer contributions come from two sources.
The first is the contribution that taxpayers make as local taxpayers
responsible for teacher salaries. Local contributions are often legally
required at a rate 1g of teacher wages; supplemental contributions above
flg
are also possible. These payments are made by the local school district to
the state teacher pension plan. The second contribution is made by taxpayers
through the state legislature's decision to supplement the local
contributions. We shall denote the total of' local school district
contributions as Cg and the state legislative contribution as p.In addition
to their required contributions (at rate '1e of wages), employees may be asked
to make supplemental contributions to the plan; these supplemental
contributions from employees we denote as Interest earnings equal the
16. 11.3-9—
plan's rate of return (r) times the level of last period's assets—-that is,
rA1. Finally, benefits paid to plan members (denoted b) go to current
retirees and to other members for disability or as lump-sum payments upon
withdrawal from plan. Formally, n can be specified as:
np+c +s ÷rA —b.
g e -1
In fact, the net contribution relationship may be more than a mere budget
identity. The institutions which administer the pension system may allow for
the possibility of a less than dollar for dollar relationship between gross
and net contributions. A dollar that flows into the pension system from 0g
and5e may not be fully allocated to the accumulation of pension assets via an
increase in n. Taxpayers may instruct their elected representatives
administering the pension to circumvent plan regulations and syphon off a
portion, of (cg +Se)for use elsewhere in the state budget.2 If so,
only (1 -)(cg
÷ will be finally allocated to assets via n.It is also
possible for current taxpayers to tap into interest earnings. Most state laws
only require that interest earnings up to a pre-assigned interest rate to
remain within the pension fund; "excess" earnings, denoted as (rA1), may be
allocated to other state activities.3 If so, then only (1 -)(rA1)remains
within the pension accounts for accumulation via n.If in fact state—
administered pension plans can be so manipulated for the benefit of the
general state budget, then the net contribution equation becomes a behavioral




Equation (4) will be estimated as part of our behavioral model of pension
uriderfundings.
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Equations (1)-(14) define the dynamicpathof pension underfundings. For
this analysis the pension plan's replacement rate (s),therate of COLA
protection (p),therequired rates of employee and local taxpayer
contributions (Tie and flg) and the typical number of years of service CR) are
taken as given. The rate of inflation () is also exogenous. Endogenous to
the analysis and specified as part of a behavioral model of pension
underfundings are teacher wages (w), teacher employment CL), state government
contributions (p), total local government contributions (Cg) supplemental
employee contributions the average rate of return on pension assets Cr),
and total benefits paid (b).
B. A Behavioral Model of Underfundings
Three groups have a vested interest in the outcomes of the pension
benefit and funding decisions: current teachers (and retirees), current
taxpayers (and their children), and future taxpayers. However, only two of
these groups have a direct say in the final allocations. Benefits and
fundings are decided by current teachers and current taxpayers within the
state and local fiscal process. Yet future taxpayers are not without
influence. To the extent current taxpayers become future taxpayers by
remaining within the state, the voices of future taxpayers will be heard by
proxy. Further, future taxpayers may simply refuse to pay for pensions over
which they had no direct say. Finally, future taxpayers can demand a
compensating reduction in land prices equal to any unfunded pension
liabilities created by the decisions of current taxpayers and teachers. The
first strategy-—proxy voting——requires a low rate of resident turnover in
the state. If a majority of current taxpayers move before the pensions fall
due then the voice of future taxpayers, even if heard, will most likely go
unheeded. Thesecondstrategy--refusal to pay—-has been effectively removed
16. 11.3—11—
by the courts in most states; the pension agreement is nowviewed as a
contractual obligation.5 It is the third strategy—-capitalization of
underfundings—-WhiCh offers future taxpayers their best hope of influencing
the current pension decisions of present taxpayers and teachers.
Against the backdrop of voter turnover, court enforcement, and potential
capitalization, current taxpayers and teachers negotiate the level of' pension
benefits and pension funding. Negotiations take place within three distinct
institutional settings. The first-—pension fund regulation and
administration—-enforces existing rules as established by the fund's enabling
legislation. A pension board, composed of current taxpayers (generally
appointed by the governor or state legislature) and current teachers
(generally elected by plan members), sets benefit levels (b), determines
contributions from teachers and local taxpayers (Cg) and defines the
plan's investment policy and hence the rate of return on assets (r). The
second institutional level-—the state legislature——defines a supplemental
contribution (p) for the funding of the pensions. The allocation p from the
state legislature is set as part of the general state budgetary process and is
meant to meet any special financial needs of the fund, defined in most cases
by a recent actuarial evaluation of the plan's funding status. At the third
level of decision—making, the local school district level, current taxpayers
and current teachers bargain over the level of teachers' salaries (w) and
employment (t). Decisions by taxpayers and teachers within these regulatory,
legislative, and local bargaining institutions define the seven endogenous
variables (b, Cg Se r, p, w, and c) needed to predict--along with the four
funding equations in (1) to (14) above—-the future path of pensiondebt.6
Tables 2 arid 3 summarize the specification and estimation of a pension


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































period i971-1980. Benefits (b) and contributions (Cg Se ) are defined in
real (1967) dollars per taxpayer. The fund's rate of return Cr) is defined as
the plan's current investment earnings divided by last year's level of'assets,
both measured in 1967 dollars. Teacher wages (w) are measured in real (1967)
dollars per teacher while teacher employment (9W)isspecified as the number of
public school teachers per 1000 taxpayers. Equations (5)-(8) of Table 2 and
equations (9)-(11) of Table 3 were estimated jointly by three—stage least
squares because of possible correlation of error terms across the seven
behavioral equations; the variables b, Cg 5e' r, p, w, and 9.areendogenous.
Benefits are paid to current retirees and to disabled teachers or to
teachers who withdraw from the plan during the year. The pension regulation
board is responsible for setting benefits according to a previously legislated
benefit structure for retirees and disabled workers——defined here by a state
specific constant term times the lagged wage bill, O(wz) 1--but the board may
offer supplemental benefits to eligible members if it wishes. These
supplemental benefits are hypothesized to depend upon the level of private
good prices in the state (CPI) and the availability of income to the fund from
contributions (Cg +Se)and investment earnings (rA_1). Estimated
eq. (5) does show state pension boards will supplement statutory benefits in
times of rising prices and as contributions and investment earnings
increase. The significant positive effect of (cg + and (rA_1) on benefits
is important for it shows a willingness on the part of the pension board to
channel current income into current benefits.
The contribution equations specify employer (Cg) and supplemental
employee contributions to be a fixed rate times the expected wage bill.
The expected wage bill is specified as last period's wage bill per taxpayer
plus the expected growth in the wage bill:(1 +w)(wZ)1,where wisthe
16. 11.3—13—
annualrate of growth in the wage bill over the decade 1971-1980. For
employers (i.e., school districts), the rate of contribution consists of the
statutory rate of contribution (n) plus a supplemental rate of contribution
set by the pension board. This supplemental rate is assumed to depend upon
the level of state prices (CPI), the level of lagged underfunding per
taxpayer (U1), the expected growth in the wage bill (1 +),whether the plan
is integrated with social security (if so, SS1, 0 otherwise), whether the
plan is a teacher-only plan (if so, TEACH1, 0 otherwise), the percent of'
the pension board which is elected by the members (%ELC), the percent of last
year's taxpayers who remain within the state (STAY), and whether the governor
(to whom the board generally reports) is a Republican (if so, REP1, 0
otherwise). For employees, the supplemental rate of contribution is also
specified to depend upon the CPI, U1, (1 +w),SS, TEACH, %ELC, STAY and REP,
though we may see different effects of these variables on cg and 5e because of
the desire of the pension board to shift the funding burdens between teachers
and current taxpayers. Note that the statutory contributions by employees at
rate are not included here for they have already been specified within the
model as part of the actuarial constant c; see equation (2).
Four general points emerge from the estimated contribution
equations (6) and (7). Rising private good prices elicit a higher rate of
taxpayer contributions but leave teacher contributions (given real wages)
unaffected. When seen in conjunction with the benefit equation, it appears
teachers are able to extract real transfers from current taxpayers in an
inflationary environment. Second, the insignificant effect of U_1 and the
significant negative effect of real wage growth and STAY on contributions
implies a strong pay-as-you-go bias to contribution behavior. Third,
participation in social security and the fact that a plan may be for teachers
16.11.3only both reduce the rates of employer and employee contributions. We
interpret both effects as an indication that perceived future plan security by
employees will encourage less funding. Finally, politics matter. Increased
representation by teachers on the pension board and the political inclination
of the administering agent--the governor--both have important effects on
contributions. The effects, both negative, may seem counter-intuitive, but
there are good reasons for believing the results. If teachers are confident
that they will receive their pensions, then it is in their interest to
minimize current taxpayer funding of pensions. The released dollars can then
be allocated to current period wage and employment growth. This is exactly
the behavior we observe here. The negative effect of Republican governors on
funding, all else equal, reflects the general tendency of Republicans to be
the party of tax control in the 197Os.8
In contrast to contribution behavior, investment performance seems
largely immune to overt political manipulation. Equation (8) estimates the
determinants of portfolio performance measured against the risk-free rate of
return on Treasury Bills (rf) for the year, (r -rf).The pension's
performance is compared to the return on a "market portfolio" of stocks,
bonds, time deposits, and mortgages, similarly measured against the risk-free
rate, (rm -rf).9If the return on the pension portfolio is perfectly
correlated with movements in the market portfolio, then the coefficient on
(rm —rf)__calledthe beta coefficient——will be 1; if the two portfolios are
uncorrelated then the coefficient on (rm —rf)will be zero. In fact, for the
decade 1971-80, teacher pension portfolios appear irnmuned from movements in
the returns of a general market portfolio. Rather, teacher pension portfolios
largely tracked the risk-free Treasury rate. Furthermore, a specification
which allowed the beta coefficient to vary across states could be rejected in
16.11.3—15—
favor of a common coefficient.° All states seem to play a conservative
investment strategy.
Table 3detailsthe influence of the determinants of state pension
funding via legislative allocation (p) and teacher wages (w) and employment
(.t) via local school district labor bargaining. The model specified here is a
linear, reduced form model of legislative bargaining and local labor
negotiations; Inman (1986b) presents the underlying structural model.
Supplemental pension funding by the state legislature-—p in eq. (9)-—is seen
to depend upon exogenous fiscal resources available to the state budget
(income, non-matching federal aid, and any spill-overs to the general budget
from contributions to the pension budget from 5e' Cg or rA_1); the net—of-
federal-deduction tax price for state spending (1 -tfwhere t is the
marginal tax rate for the state's median income); the relative bargaining
position of teachers versus taxpayers in the legislature, measured by the
political resources of the National Education Association lobby (NEA dues per
teacher, the presence of an NEA legislative liaison, and the power of the ally
public union AFSCME); the potential voice of future taxpayers in the state
legislature, measured by the percent of taxpayers who stay within the state
from one year to the next (STAY); and the stock of pension underfunding per
taxpayer in the previous year (U_1) whose influence on p may vary if there
exists a court-enforced pension guarantee. State legislative decisions on p
may also be influenced by the expected levels of teacher wages and
employment. If so, the exogenous determinants of w and L should also be
included in the pension funding equation as well as in the wage and employment
equations. Those variables include the likely determinants of' the demand for
education such as state income and the net-of-federal-deduction tax price as
well as such tastes—for-education variables as the percent of local taxable
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%Collective!'otes for Table 3
PEach equation also includes state specific constant terms. For each
equation, income and fiscal variables are measured in real 1967 dollars and
all other independent variables have been deflated by the state price index
(CPI); see fn. 11.
*All coefficients marked by an *exceedtheir standard errors (reported
within parentheses) by at least 1.65.
**The value of is from the first stage estimates of each equation.
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property which is commercial-industrial, the percent of' the population over
the age 65, the number of school age children per family, and the percent of
school age children in public schools. Also important to the local
determination of wages and employment is the local labor bargaining
environment, specified here by the percent of school districts with more than
2500 teachers, the percent of teachers covered by collective bargaining
agreements, the alternative private sector wage (measured by the state's
average wage earned in retail and wholesale trade and selective services) and
its interaction with the percent of' teachers covered by bargaining, and an
actuarial constant (denoted t) which measures the current period cash value of
future retirement benefits specified as the ratio of required full-funding
contributions to current wages (the meanequals .17 for our sample).
Finally, local school wages and employment will also be strongly influenced by
state-to-local school aid, a variable determined as part of the legislative
deliberations which set state pension funding. Thus all the exogenous
determinants of p--which also define state school aid—-will have a role to
play in setting w and z.
Themodel's specification also allows for a direct influence of' the
state's private good price level (denoted CPI) on the nominal levels of state
pension contributions (p) and on teacher wages (w). While an effort is often
made in bargaining and budget negotiations to track a state's cost-of-living
with nominal adjustments in fiscal variables such as p and w, there is no
reason to think the process does so perfectly. To capture this direct effect
of price adjustments on the real values of p and w, we first specify these
equations in nominal terms. All variables are then deflated by the state
price index (CPI). While CPI does not appear directly in the real p and real
w equations, the intercept term in those equations will measure the direct
16.1 1.3effect of price changes on p and w. These results are reported in Table 3 as
the direct CPI effect. For the teacher equation (9.), all exogenous variables
are measured in real terms and the state CPI is entered directly into the 9.
equation.11 Table 3 reports the influence of all exogenous variables on p
(eq. 9), w (eq. 10), and 9. (eq. 11).
State income, federal aid, and the net-of-deduction tax price have no
significant effect on legislated pension funding. What does influence
legislated funding are the dollar flows into the regulated pension accounts
via 5e' °g' and rA1. Additional payments by local taxpayers through cg are
offset by a $.52 per dollar reduction in spending on p. Increases in teacher
contributions to funding through Se lead to an insignificant increase in p of'
$.05 per dollar. Finally, a one dollar increase in interest earnings
increases p by $.38. Together, however, there is a small net decline in
legislative contributions (p) of $.03 as total regulated contributions rise by
one dollar ($.33 from Cg 5e and rA1, respectively). This tiny cutback in
legislative spending on p is allocated to increased expenditures on other
state activities or to state tax relief; not shown here, but see Inman
(1986b).
Just as with administratively set pension contributions (eg and e' the
lagged stock of pension underfundings (U_1) has only a small effect on the
legislated contributions (p) and the subsequent accumulation of pension
assets. For example, from Table 3 a $100 increase in the stock of pension
underfundings per taxpayer has no effect on legislated contributions in states
without a pension guarantee (Pension Guaranteed0) and only a $.50/taxpayer
effect on p ($.50 = (-.000 +.005)x $100) in states where pensions are
guaranteed (Pension Guaranteed1). If continued for 30 years (a typical
repayment period for new pension debt), this $.50/taxpayer flow will
16. 11.3-18-
accumulate (assuming a real rate of return of .03) to about $25/taxpayer in
pension assets by year 30, the present value of which (discounting at .03) is
$10.30. Thus an exogenous increase of $100 in pension debt stimulates at most
a $10.30 increase in pension assets from legislative contributions. Again, we
observe a preference for pay—as-you-go financing for teacher pensions, now on
the part of elected legislators.
The teacher coalition does not seem to be a strong counterforce to the
apparent pressure from taxpayers to ignore underfundings. Teachers do not
allocate their state political influence-—measured here by the variables 'JEA
Dues and NEA Liaison-—to pension funding; both variables are statistically and
quantitatively insignificant. What does seem to help pension funding is
pressure from current taxpayers who stay within the state. An increase of' .03
in the percent of state residents who do not move in a given year (a one
standard deviation increase from a mean of' .89) will increase funding by about
$3.22 per taxpayer adjusted for the level of' state prices. Interestingly,
AFSCME membership also matters. A doubling of the percent of state employees
in AFSCME (from a mean of .10 to .20) increases pension funding for teachers
by about $.62 adjusted for state prices.12 Finally, the demographic downturn
in the number of school age children and an increase in private education have
also helped state funding. As the number of children in public schools
decline, there is less pressure on the current education budget and hence less
need for state school aid. This frees a few dollars for pension funding.A
10% decline in the number of' children in public schools increases real
spending on p by $1.13/taxpayer through the variable School-Age Kids and by
$.83/taxpayer through the variable IEnrolledin Public Schools.3
In contrast to pension funding, teacher wages (w) and employment ()do
seem to attract economic resources and political capital. Residential income
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and federal aid both have positive effects on wages (the income elasticity
equals .25 while the aid elasticity is .08). Federal aid also stimulates
local teacher employment (the elasticity is .10). Income has a statistical
significant, but quantitatively unimportant, negative effect on employment
(the elasticity equals -.05). Measures of the net tax costs of the teacher
budget-—(1 -tf)and %CommercialProperty--are generally insignificant.
Inflation, however, significantly increases real wages, an increase which is
offset in part by a significant decline in teacher employment; on balance, the
teacher wage bill (wL) rises with inflation. States with more large school
districts (%Districts>2500teachers) also have higher wages and
employment. Increases in the number of teachers covered by collective
bargaining (%CollectiveBargaining) is a two-edged sword for teachers. The
results show teachers wages are initially lower in unionized as opposed to
non—unionized states. That is, non-unionized states offer a wage premium for
teachers not to organize. But once organized, unionized states do better in
protecting the teachers' relative wage position vis a vis the private
sector. In more unionized states wages rise with the private wages; in non—
unionized states they do not. These results also show a weak positive effect
of unionization on employment. The strongest influence of teacher
organizations appears to be at the state level, however. Teacher
organizations active in state politics——in this case the NEA--can have a
significant positive effect on teacher wages and employment through the
organization's ability to increase state—to—local school aid. Those effects
are seen in this reduced form model as the positive effects of NEA Dues and
the FlEA Liaison on w and £.Finally,while the demographic downturn in
school. age children in the last decade helped to stimulate increased state
pension funding (p), equations (10) and (11) reveal that it has also prompted
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an increase in pension liabilities via an increase in teacher wages and
employment.
The structure of the pension system is also a potential influence on
teacher wages and employment. But perhaps the most important result is the
non-effect of lagged pension underfundings (U1) on w and 2. Even when
pensions are not legally guaranteed, teachers do not receive a significant
increase in wages as U_1 increases; underfundings are not capitalized into
higher wages. Similarly, underfundings do not affect employment. What does
seem to influence w and 9. are the level of promised pension benefits, measured
here by ratio of required full-funding contributions to wages (a). As
rises, there is a compensating decline in teacher wages, but the amount of the
decline is less than dollar for dollar of benefit increase and is not
statistically significant. Benefit increases therefore mean an increase in
the total wage plus benefit cost (:(1+i)w)of hiring a teacher. This
increase in labor costs via the increase in z induces a small, and
statistically significant, decline in employment; the elasticity of 9 with
respect tois -.07.However, the combined effect of an increase inon the
total compensation paid to teacher ((1 +A)w2)is slightly positive.15
Finally, the regulated pension accounts can feed back to influence teacher
wages and employment. Increases in pension contributions from teachers (via
Se), taxpayers (via cg) and assets (via rA_1) do not--as we show below in
equation ()-—remain fully within the pension accounts. These dollars leak
out for expenditures elsewhere in the fiscal system. One outlet is increased
state-to—local school aid which in turn can be spent on increasing teacher
wages and employment. This appears to be what happens. Teacher contributions
(Se) increaseand and 2, taxpayer contributions (Og) have no effect, while
asset earnings (rA_1) have a negative effect on 2. and an insignificant effect
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on w. Their joint effect is to increase teacher wages and to leave teacher
employment largely unchanged. For each dollar increase in exogenously
regulated pension funding ($.33 from 5e plus $.33 from cg plus $.33 from
rA_1), there is a final $.1O increase in the teacher wagebill.16
The future consequences of these changes in funding, benefits, teacher
wages, and employment are realized through the process of asset accumulation
and liability creation for the pension fund. Equation (14) describes net
savings behavior for the fund:17
(14)n.9146 ( —b}+.627(Cg + +.089(rA,1)
,2
(.109)* (.086)* (.115)
If the fund administrators simply pass dollars into the fund from
contributions and withdraw dollars to pay brief its, then all the estimated
coefficients in eq. (14) would be 1. This is in fact the case for state
contributions less total benefits paid, (p —b),whose coefficient is not
significantly different from unity. The coefficients on required
contributions and on interest earnings, however, are both significantly less
than 1, and indicate that only $.627 of every regulated dollar of
contributions +
Og)
and only $.089 of every dollar of investment income
(rA1) are retained within the fund for future asset accumulation. Where do
the remaining $.373 of contributions and $.911 of investment earnings go? The
answer is into the general state budget for expenditure on state-to—local
school aid (and ultimately on w and 9.), for other state expenditures, or for
general tax relief. As we saw above, state legislated pension funding (p)
does not increase as (s +a+rA) rises. e g -1
The final link in the behavioral model is the specification of the
actuarial constant fl which connects current wages and employment to the
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expected liability of the fund.A linear specification for c2 gives:18
(2) 5.L1a +96(pi)-105e
+.079R+12.62u-3.1O(TEACH),p2875
(.87)* (2.61)* (5•50)* (.007)* (6.30)* (.22)*
As expected, pension liabilities increase as the benefit replacement rate (a)
increases, as COLA protection (pu) improves, and as the required rate of'
employee contributions declines. Liabilities are also shown to rise, on
balance, as years to retirement (R) increase and the rate of wage growth (w)
rises;for both variables their positive influence on benefits dominates their
effects on added required contributions. Finally, a constant term for
teacher—only plans (TEACH) is included to capture the systematic differences
between the actuarial experiences of teachers and the general state employee
(e.g., longevity, work histories) or any systematic differences in plan
benefits not measured by a and pu; see, for example, the results in Quinn
(1982).
The pension underfunding identity in equation (1), the estimated 2
specification in (2), the asset accumulation identity in (3), the net savings
equation in (Li), the regulated benefit and funding equations in (5)-(8), and
the legislative and local bargaining equations in (9)-(11) together define a
reduced form model of teacher underfundings. Given starting values for the
stock of underfundings (U_1) and pension assets (A_1), the model is capable of
predicting the future path of teacher pension debt for alternative paths of
the model's exogenous variables. Section C maps the pattern of underfunding
to the year 2000 for five such future regimes.
C. Trends in Underfunding
Table i summarizes the path of underfundings to the year 2000 for five
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































case," Bureau of Census projections (1984) for future population growth are
used to define the growth in school age children per family (Kids per Family)
and the percent of the population over 65 (% > 65 years). The recent
historical record is the basis for projecting future incomes (Income), private
sector wages (Private Wage), interest rates (rthe Treasury Bill rate),
inflation rates and the level of the state CPI), federal aid (Federal Aid),
and Republican control of governorships (REP); see Table 4 for details. All
other exogenous variables of the model are fixed at their 1980 values for the
duration of thesiu1ations We then examine the effects of four potentially
important deviations from the base case trends: a new baby boom, a high
inflation rate, a move to full coverage of all teachers under collective
bargaining agreements, and a return to the 1970's levels of federal aid for
state-local government. For each simulation we report the average 1980 level
of underfundings for our sample of the 148 mainland states (U(1980)), the
average level of underfundings in the year 2000 (U(2000)), and the annual rate
of growth in underfundings from 1980 to 2000 (c').Thesimulation results are
also reported for three subsamples of states. The first group consists of all
states whose ratio of underfuriding to income in 1980 was .10 or less; this
group is called the "well—funded" subsample. The next subsample consists of
all states with 1980 underfunding to income ratios between .1 and .15; these
states are called the "near-risk" states. The final group, called the "at-
risk" group, is the small subset of poorly funded plans with 1980 underfunding
to income ratios greater than .15.19
Perhaps the single most important conclusion from the results in Table 14
is the fact that teacher pension underfundings will not go away by
themselves. If the funding and benefit behavior exhibited during the 1970's
continues for the next twenty years, the average level of underfundings in our
16.11.3sample states for the base case simulation will grow at a rate of' 1.53% per
year, from $249 per taxpayer to $337 per taxpayer. The upward trend is
observed for all three state subsamples as well. Simulations 2-5 in Table 4
show how sensitive the future path of underfundings is to four, possibly
damaging, structural changes. Neither a new baby boom in 1990 nor a moderate
increase in the rate of inflation is likely to affect the pattern of
underfundings very much. In fact, both tend to lower the growth rate slightly
from that seen in the base case. What does matter are structural changes that
drive up the overall wage bill for education. Increased unionization and
increased federal aid do Just that. By the year 2000, underfundings per
taxpayer have increased over their 1980 values by 1414% with full unionization
and by 59% with a return to the 1970's levels of federal-to-state aid.
We conclude that a hands-off approach to the issue pension
underfundings--barring the saving grace of capitalization--may only lead to
larger problems in the future. The revealed inclinations of the present
benefit and funding process is to channel resources to current teachers and
taxpayers. Existing state government regulations for employer, employee, and
legislative contributions are, it seems, easily and willingly circumvented.
It is important therefore to consider the effectiveness of alternative,
central government regulations of these pension systems.
IV. Central Policies for Local Debt
The central government can adopt one, or more, of' three policies towards
the control of local debt, each of which has a specific formulation for the
management of pension underfundings. The first strategy--control local
spending——appears here as a control of pension benefits. The second
strategy——require added local taxation-—becomes a central government
requirement forincreased pension funding.The final strategy--the central
16. 11.3-25-
assumption of excessive local debt——can be specified as a central government
program to "bail-out" those pension plans on the verge of bankruptcy.
A. Central Policies for Underfundings2°
1. Control of Pension Benefits: Available evidence suggests state and
local government employees receive significantly better pensions than their
colleagues in the private sector. Recent research by Quinn (1982) estimates
that a typical member of a state pension plan has a promised pension wealth
(even after adjustments for employee contributions) which is as much as 80%
larger than the wealth available to an identical worker in the private
sector. Members of local government plans have pensions which are on average
30% more valuable than those available to a comparable private worker. Given
these facts, it is useful to consider central government regulations which
reduce pension benefits paid to public workers. Two reforms are considered
here. The first policy reduces the promised rate of benefit accruals to new
employees by 50% from their current levels, the net effect of which is to
reduce the replacement rate for benefits paid upon retirement. Since this
benefit reduction policy will be limited to new employees only, for a time the
state will be required to administer two pension plans. We assume that
funding for the new pension plan will be under the funding rules now in force
for the original state plan. To the extent those rules are followed as before
(a favorable assumption), aggregate pension underfundings should decline. The
second policy to reduce pension benefits is to cut the COLA protection for all
employees through a reduction in the rate of inflation coverage, .Eorthese
simulations here, a 50% cut in rate of inflation protection is considered.
2. Increased Contributions: The analysis above, and in Inman (1982,
1986b), show a strong bias in state and local funding practices towards pay-
as—you-go behavior. While state pension enabling legislations do contain
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minimal required rates of contributions by employees and taxpayers as well as
explicit provision for actuarial evaluations and subsequent full-funding, most
states have devised fiscal strategies to escape these regulations. In the
face of such behavior, the central government can adopt one or both of two
contribution regulations. First, the central government can simply require
more money be collected from employees and taxpayers, but leave to the state
all responsibility for allocating those dollars into pension funding. We
should expect——from eq. (14)-—that a fraction of the required increased
contributions will be "lost" before they become pension assets.
Alternatively, the central government could adopt national standards for
pension funding and then monitor state contributions to insure that these
required dollars are in fact allocated to pension assets. We shall simulate
the effects of both strategies. The first policy will simply require states
to increase contributions to a level which in theory would remove the existing
level of pension underfunding and any new accruing underfundings within forty
years. The second policy supplements these required contributions with a
central government enforcement effort to insure that all new contributions are
in fact allocated to pension savings.
3. Debt Relief: Funding relief for obviously troubled pension plans is a
final policy alternative. Such a program would provide central government
assistance in the form of federal contributions to the troubled state plan,
contributions which could then be given immediately to retirees (if plan
assets are not sufficient to cover even current benefit obligations) or saved
to lower underfundings. Such a policy will require an explicit definition of
what constitutes a state plan "in trouble." Without such a standard, all
states would have strong incentives to simply let the central government fund
their pensions. For the debt relief simulations presented here, we define a
16.11.3—27—
state plan as "troubled"--and thus eligible for federal pension aid--if the
yearly level of steady-state contributions required to fully-fund the pension
plan over a forty-year horizon exceed 30% of the current year's wage bill for
plan employees. The choice of .30 as an upper limit to a state's full-funding
rate of' contribution--beyond which federal aid is possible—-is, of course, a
policy decision. A higher limit will mean that fewer states will qualify as
"troubled." Once a state plan qualifies, the central government is assumed to
cover all of the needed contributions above the .30 limit through federal
pension aid--that is, Pension AidC -.3w2.,where C is the required full—
funding contribution and Aid0. There will, of course, be a moral hazard
problem with such a policy; offering federal aid to pension plans in serious
trouble may only further discourage own contributions. To offset this
difficulty, the central government can offer bail—out aid which is directly
related to the state's own level of contributions. To illustrate the point,
we therefore consider a second pension aid program which not only covers the
gap of full-funding contributions above 30% of the wage bill but also matches
each state's own contributions dollar for dollar—-that is, Pension Aid
MatchC —.3wL+'e"'
+ 5e + cg +￿0.
There is, unfortunately, no exogenous variable called federal pension aid
in our model of state funding behavior. To simulate the effects of pension
aid we therefore assume that federal pension aid influences pension funding
decisions like an extra dollar of pension fund investment income--that is,
like (rA_1) in Table 3 and equation (14).21 If that observed behavior is in
fact how federal pension aid performs, then only $.469 of each aid dollar will
actually be allocated to net asset creation; $.089 of each dollar goes
directly into assets (eq. (Li))whilean additional $.380 of each dollar
arrives via legislatively set contributions (p). The remaining $.531 is
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allocatedto other state activities. To prevent such re-allocations, the
central government can attempt to regulate the allocation of pension aid
relief to insure that each dollar of pension aid is in fact saved. To
simulate the effects of such a pension aid plus enforcement policy, we
exogenously impose the constraint that all aid be saved. We report the
results as a pension aid with match plus enforcement policy.
A "PERISA" Program: Reform to effectively control the funding status
of public employee pension plans has been a Congressional concern since
1976. Legislation entitled the Public Employee Retirement and Income Security
Act (PERISA) has since been introduced to insure a stronger funding basis for
state and local pension plans. While these bills have emphasized centrally
enforced reporting and monitoring of funding status (an obvious first step),
we could well imagine a more extensive PERISA policy. Following the lead of'
its private pension counterpart (ERISA), such a PERISA program might well
include benefit regulations, contribution regulations, and pension debt
relief. To test for the effects of such a PERISA program, we will simulate
the path of underfundings for two combined policy packages. Under PERISA-1 we
combine contribution regulations with the pension aid plus match program for
any states which fall within the previously-specified "troubled" category.
PERISA-2 adds a 50% reduction in the pension benefit replacement rate for new
employees only to the PERISA—1 package. For both the PERISA-1 and PERISA-2
reforms, we assume the federal government adopts the strong enforcement
structure needed to insure contributed dollars and pension aid are allocated
to pension savings.
B. TheEffects of Pension ReformPolicies
Table 5 summarizes the effects of central government pension policies on































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































underlying economic and political structure of the "base case" simulation
presented in Table 4, the results of which are repeated in Table 5. Table 5
also details exactly how each policy reform is implemented within the
structure of the simulation model. For each policy simulation, Table 5
reports the initial 1980 level of underfundings U(1980), the post-policy level
of underfundings by the year 2000 U(2000), and the annual rate of growth in U
from 1980 to 2000 (u). Results are for the full sample of mainland states and
for each of the three pension risk subsamples.
The results in Table 5 are instructive. Central government policies
which regulate benefits or contributions or which offer pension aid to reduce
excessive underfundings do reduce the level of locally created pension debt.
In all cases considered here, the central government reform reduced
underfundings in the year 2000 below what they would have been in the base
case without reform. It is also important to note that among the three risk-
group subsainples of states, each reform has its strongesteffect for those six
states whose 1980 levels of underfundings place the state pension most "at—
risk."
Among the separate reform options, the most effective policy is
regulation of contributions (reforms 2a and 2b). The least effective policies
are cuts in the rate of COLA protection (reform la) (primarily because we
assume only modest levels of inflation in the future) and pension debt
relief. Pension aid with a matching provision to minimize moral hazard
(reform 3b) performs better than simple pension aid (reform 3a). Pension aid
with a match and with federal enforcement to insure aid dollars are actually
saved (reform 3c) is the most effective of the debt relief policies considered
here.
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Of the PERISA—type reforms, the PERISA—1 policy (reform lla)——fully
regulated contributions (reform 2b) combined with enforced pension aid plus
match (reform 3c)-—performs about as well as the fully regulated contribution
policy (reform 2b) alone. This is not surprising as contribution regulations
move most states below the underfunding cut-off needed for the receipt of
aid. Adding benefit regulations (reform ib) to the PERISA package to create
PERISA-2 (reform Lb), reduces underfundings still further. The two regulatory
policies-—reforms lb and 2b-—are roughly additive in their effects on the
levels of underfundings. Pension aid adds little to the effectiveness of
these reforms in reducing U, except in the few "at-risk" states. In the end,
PERISA-l and PERISA—2 make significant in—roads toward reducing the stock of
state-local government pension debt.
Table 6 summarizes the incidence effects of the major, alternative reform
strategies. The impact of' benefit reductions (reform lb), contribution
regulations (reform 2a), pension debt relief (reform 3a), and a strong PERISA
policy (reform 14b) are reported for teachers and retirees, current and future
taxpayers, and public school-age children. The position of current teachers
is defined by teacher wages (in 1967 dollars) less supplemental contributions
to the pension plan and by their net pension wealth per
teacher (Wnw). The position of present retirees is defined by benefits
paid per retiree (B, in 1967 dollars). The position of current taxpayers is
specified by each taxpayer's after—tax income (yIncome —(1-tf){all
state taxes —
Cg
—wL},in 1967 dollars), while the position of future
taxpayers' is given by the value of' pension underfunding per taxpayer (U, in
1967 dollars). We also report the student—teacher ratio for public school-age
children (t) to examine the effect of pension reform on the provision of


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































base case and for each policy reform in Table 5; we compare the position of'
each group in 1980 before reform to their position in the year 2000 after
reform.
Comparing the base case and reform outcomes reveals that the annual
income position of teachers is not much affected by reform. The only modest
change is the increase over the base case in teacher income in the year 2000
with full-funding contributions. This occurs because the spill-over of
pension funding into state school aid and finally into wages is larger than
the teachers' specified share of increased contributions. Ps expected,
teachers' pension wealth is most significantly affected in the year 2000 by
the 50% cut in the replacement rate (reforms lb and Lb), while an increase in
contributions or in pension aid leaves teachers' pension wealth largely
unchanged. Retirees lose most under the benefit reduction reform (reform ib)
and gain most under a full contribution reform (reform 2a), where some of'
those contributions spill—out into retiree benefits. On balance, and not
surprisingly, teachers and retirees benefit most with full contribution
reforms, are not much affected by pension aid bail-outs, and lose the most
with those reforms which lower pension benefits.
Taxpayers looking ahead to the year 2000 see their current income
position virtually unaffected by pension reform. First, pension aid policies
are limited to a few crisis situations; thus federal taxes to run the aid
program are trivial. Second, benefit reductions cost taxpayers nothing
directly and have only a very small (in fact slightly negative) compensation
effect on wL through the variable 1; see the discussion ofin III.B above.
Third, contribution reforms will lower the average taxpayer's income as °g and
p are increased, but some of these monies are returned as state tax relief
(see III.B above); the net effect is a small reduction in y. Taxpayers today
16.11.3-32-
do benefit from reform, however, in that unfunded pension debt (U) is reduced
by the year 2000. As we saw from Table 5, regulated contributions (reform
2a), reduced benefits (reform lb), and the two reforms together (reform 14b)
have significant effects in reducing U.
Finally, public school children are hurt by each reform strategy as the
student to teacher ratio rises over what it would have been (the base case)
without reform. The effect is most significant for the reform requiring full—
funding of existing pensions; here increased contributions make teachers more
expensive on the current accounts and thereby discourage the hiring of new
teachers. Note, however, that the continued demographic downturn in the
number of school-age children over the next twenty years more than offsets the
effects of any pension reform.
Two primary conclusions emerge from these simulations of pension
reform. First, central government benefit regulations and regulations to
insure full-funding contributions can significantly reduce the stock of
outstanding state teacher pension debt. Pension "bail-out" aid relief can
slow the growth of debt but will not reduce the stock of existing
underfundings. Second, of all the reform strategies, a central government
policy to regulate contributions (reforms 2a and 2b) may be the most
acceptable to all parties involved. Current teachers and retirees are not
much harmed, in fact they are slightly better off under reform 2a. Current
taxpayers lose a small amount of real income but gain in that they avoid a
growing pension debt to be paid as future taxpayers. The only constituency
who loses are school..age children as fewer new teachers are hired under
reform. But the general decline in public enrollments for demographic reasons
softens this consequence.
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If this full-funding policy is so attractive, then, why hasn't it already
been adopted as a reform strategy for growing pension debt? To answer this
question is to return to our opening theme: The incentives in a decentralized
fiscal system are against it.In an economy with less—than—fully informed yet
mobile taxpayers, the incentives at the state and local levels are to
underfund and run. Why pay for your current public employees' pensions when
you may have to pay again when you relocate in another state? While we may
all be better off with full—funding, the micro-motives in our decentralized
fiscal system are to underfund. Like any prisoner's dilemma situation, only
an imposed (i.e., regulated) strategy can insure a favored outcome. In this
case, the regulator is the central government, and the imposed strategy is
full-funding.
V. Summary and Conclusions
Without proclaiming a state and local fiscal crisis, this paper has
sought to raise the issue of growing local government debt and to ask what a
central government might do, if anything, to check that growth. The analysis
has focused on one form of state and local debt: underfunded teacher
pensions. We have presented evidence that this form of debt is sizeable and
growing and have argued that such debt may have significant adverse
consequences for economic efficiency and equity. While the private market may
be able to neutralize the consequences of excessive borrowing through land
value capitalization, there is as yet no clear evidence for, or against, this
hypothesis. Nor is there any reason to believe the problem of growing state—
local debt will correct itself. As we have seen here, the motivations of the
major players in a decentralized political economy are to create not reduce
such debt. It seems prudent, therefore, to examine the possible effectiveness
of alternative central government reforms for the control of local debt
16.11.3_314...
unmatched by assets. Of the three pension reform strategies considered
here--reduce spending through benefit reductions, increase revenues through
regulated contributions, or grant debt relief via pension aid--each can ease
the growth in pension debt and one approach-—regulating contributions--does so
with only modest burdens on employees and taxpayers. Of course, the fact that
our analysis was limited to only one form of local debt qualifies these
conclusions. Whether these results generalize to other forms of excessive
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1This specification of U is based upon the "plan continuation liability"
of the pension, under the assumption that the plan will be offered into the
foreseeable future. In contrast, the unfunded liability of a private pension
may more appropriately be measured by what is called the plan termination
liability, under the assumption that the firm has the right to pay off all
future pension obigations to existing employees at any time; see Bulow (1982).
2The reason for this fiscal sleight-of-hand is that pension
administrators face de jure regulations for pension fundings which on the
surface, at least, must appear to be met. The plan's pension enabling act
often contains explicit contribution rules which require employees to
contribute 1e of their salaries and employers to contribute an additional
of salary. Further, the enabling laws may also require a periodic
actuarial evaluation; if the required contributions above are not sufficient
to fully fund the pensions then supplemental contributions from employees,
employers, and state taxpayers will be required. Administrators can legally
meet these formal requirements by insuring that sufficient dollars are paid
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intothe system. But there are no requirements that these dollars actually be
saved as net addition to assets. That is what we are testing here.
3Legally, interest earnings may be allocated back into the pension system
as a contribution to net savings (n) or may be allocated to pay for current
benefits or be spent in the general state budget. See Mote, Harvard Law
Review (1977) and the recent Wall Street Journal article (October 22, 1985, p.
33)entitled,"Movel California Pension Plan Provides an Inflation Antidote."
The analysis developed here is presented in more detail in Inrnan
(1986b). This model stands as the reduced-form equivalent of Inman's
structural model.
5See Mote, Harvard Law Review (1977).
6The three institutional settings function sequentially. Generally, the
pension board will reach its decisions on employee (Se) and employer (cg)
contributions, on benefits (b), and on portfolio investments Cr) near the end
of the calendar year as part of administrative decisions—making. Given
cg b, and r,the state legislature meets in January to March to decide p.
Then in May and June, before the start of the new fiscal year, local school
districts decide w, Q. The structural model in Inman (1986b) makes use of the
sequential nature of this budgeting process.
7Excluded from this sample of pension plans are the plans in Hawaii and
Alaska whose unique fiscal institutions do not allow an easy comparison to the
L8 mainland states. Also excluded are the few large city teacher pension
plans. The analysis covers 95% of all teachers in pension plans in1980.
8See, for example, Taylor (1986, p. 71) who quotes from an interview with
a Democratic state legislator on pension contributions and benefits:"there
are Just a few who care about (pension costs) and they are mostly Republicans
who look for ways to cut costs."
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9The market rate of returns is unique to each state and is defined by the
state-specific weighted average of' national returns of those investments which
are legally available to the state pension board for investment.
10An F—test for the equality of the state B coefficients could not reject
the null hypothesis of equal coefficients. It should be noted that this
common B coefficient is likely to be biased towards zero because of
measurement error in the specification of r. The rate of return for state
portfolios is calculated from reported plan asset values which include an
(unknown) fraction of assets valued at book, not market, value. The
measurement errors in r will likely be correlated with the independent
variable (rm -r).Despite this bias, there are good political reasons to
believe our result that B is near zero and that states adopt conservative
investment strategies for pension assets. Risky investments offer little gain
to current teachers and taxpayers if they pay-off, yet expose the pension
board to public embarrassment if they fail. For additional evidence on the
conservative bias in pension investment, see Kotlikoff and Smith (1983, p.
143L).
11Forrnally,the nominal wage and pension contribution equations are
specified as:
(w•CPI) or (p.CPI) c +BCPI SX i-( . CPI)
and estimated as:
w or p(a/CPI) +B+S(X/CPI)+
where are state—specific constant terms, X is the vector of all exogenous
variables (with fiscal variables measured in nominal terms), and c is the
equation's normally distributed error term. The teacher equation is specified
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to include CPI directly in the equation with all other exogenous variables
again deflated by the CPI:
z + CPI+o(X/CPI)+
12plexogenous variables have been deflated by the state's cost-of—
living price level, the mean value of which is $1.89 over the sample period.
Thus the marginal effect of a .03 increase in the "%WhoStay" on funding (p)
will equal, on average, dp203.16 x (.03/1.89) z $3.22. similar
calculation applies for the marginal effect of changes in AFSCME membership:
dp11.79(.10/1.89) $.62.
13Again, adjusted for the level of the state's cost—of-living ($1.89 at
the mean), the marginal effect on p of a 10% decline in school age kids per
family will equal, on average, dp—22.174 (1.13-.10)11.89$1.33,
where 1.13 is the mean number of school—age kids per family. The marginal
effect on p of a 10% decline in the percent of kids enrolled public schools
will equal, on average, dp-15.570 x (-.10/1.89) $.83.
The effect on real wages of a $9 (one standard deviation) increase in
real DUES from its mean value of $17/teacher is dw11.86 x $9$105. The
effect on real wages of introducing an NEA liaison will be dw157.08
(1/1.89)$83, adjusted for price deflation. The joint effect of these two
changes will be to increase real wages by $188 per teacher, or by 3.1% from
the mean real wage of $6020/teacher over the 1971-1980 period. Employment
also rises, but marginally, for a $9 increase in DUES; employment increases by
1% ( d/9.(.009$9) teachers/11.81 teachers). With the introduction of a
legislative liaison, employment rises by 1.L% (dQ./z.167 teachers/11.81
teachers). The joint effect of all these changes is to increase the real
teacher wage bill by a bit more than 5% (:3.1% +1%+1.4%).
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15The average value offor our sample is .17. Thus, the fully—funded
level of pension contributions for a teacher with an average wage of $6020 is
$1023. A 10% increase inimplies a $102.3 increase in fully-funded
contributions. A 10% increase indecreases teacher wages by
-$31.13 (: (.10 x .17)(-1831)). Thus a $102.3 increase in the present value
of pension benefits only reduces wages by $31.13, or about $.30 on the dollar.
Further, as $102.30 increase in benefits is only offset by $31.13 decline
in wages, the full cost per teacher rises by $71.17 for each 10% increase in
.Thisincrease in full labor costs reduces employment by 7/10's of 1% or
-.083 teachers/1000 taxpayers (:(.10 x .17)(—LL905)). The small effect on Z
is likely due to the fact that current taxpayers do not anticipate paying the
full increase in labor costs due to the increase in pension benefits.
Overall, the present value of total compensation to be paid to teachers
by taxpayers (: (1 +A)wt)rises from $83.18/taxpayer
C: (1 +.17)(6020)(11.81/1000))to $83.51/taxpayer
: (1+.187)(6020—31)(11.83—.083)/1000} for a 10% increase infrom its mean
value of .17.
16A $.33 increase in5e increases the mean w9.by$.20 [:.33x
(dw/ds)L+.33(dZ/ds)w:.33x32.51x(11.81/1000)+.33x( .036)x(6020)}; a $.33
increase in Cg increases the mean w by $.O1 (calculated as above using
dW/dCg and dQ./dcg); and a $.33 increase in rA_1decreases the mean w2, by $.11
(calculated as above using dw/drA
1
and d/dr1). The combined effect is a
$.1O increase in the mean teacher wage bill per taxpayer.
'7The net savings equation (ii) has been estimated by three-staged least
squares as part of the full fiscal system involving equations (4)-(11);
see above. The reported is from the first-stage estimate of the net
savings equation. Standard errors of coefficient estimates are within
16. 11.3parentheses; an *indicatesthe coefficient estimate exceeds the standard
error by at least 1.65.
l8Estimation was by ordinary least squares. Standard errors of
coefficient estimates are within parentheses; an *indicatesthe coefficient
estimate exceeds the standard error by at least 1.65. Data for c2arefrom
Inman (1986a).
9The choice of .15 as the "critical" pension debt/income ratio to
indicate "at-risk" states follows the convention in the bond industry to "red—
flag" governments whose ratio of all debt to market value approaches 10
percent. Since market value is usually 2.0 times income, the implied critical
or "red-flag" ratio of total debt to income would be around .20. Since non-
pension debt will usually be .05 to .10 of income, a pension debt to income
ratio ￿.15will be "critical" and a ratio 2 .10 will be "worrisome." See
Lamb and Rappaport (1980), pp. 112-115.
20A policy which we could not examine in this model--but which should be
seriously considered in any reform debate-—is to move all teacher pensions
from their current status as defined benefit plans to a new status as defined
contribution plans. In defined benefit plans annuities are based upon
worker's pre—retiremerit salary. In a defined contribution plan annuities are
based upon workers' and employers' contributions only. By definition, defined
contribution plans cannot be underfunded, and thus we avoid all of the
allocative and equity disadvantages of'underfundedpensions. We do so at a
cost, however. Defined contribution plans do not offer the worker a stable
retirement income relative to his or her pre—retirement salary; workers are
exposed to the risk of a sharp fall in their real living standard at
retirement if inadequate contributions had been made or if returns on the
invested portfolio have not kept pace with income growth; both are possible
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problemsin inflationary economies. Indexed bonds, if they are available,
could solve the problem, however. For general discussion of the relative
advantages and disadvantages of defined benefit and defined contribution
pension plans, see Bodie, Marcus, and Merton (1985).
2Since there is no currently existing Federal—to—state pension aid
program, we must assign one of the model's available independent variables to
stand as a "proxy" measure for the effects of this program. Four variables
are possible candidates: Federal Aid, 5e' cg or (rA_1). The variable (rA_1)
seems to us to be the preferred choice. The variables s and Cg which measure
teacher contributions and local taxpayer contributions compound the effect of
new pension dollars and the taxation of teachers and taxpayers. Both 5e and
Cg involve "compensation effects" at the state and local levelwhich may not
be observed with pension aid. The Federal Aid variable is the sum of all
lump-sum grants to the state. These are not pension dollars and thus Federal
Aid will not capture any pension specific effect of such aid. On the other
hand, investment earnings (rA.1) are pension fund dollars and do not involve
any present period taxation. Thus r(A1) seems the best variable to proxy for
the effects of true federal-to-state pension aid.
For comparison purposes, simulations based upon an increase in Federal
Aid are given in Table !.Aswe see there, an increase in suchassistance
will clearly do little to ease the pension debt problem.
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